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COMMENTARY
A Case for Not
Invading Iraq
By DAVID R. HENDERSON
“Saddam Hussein is a madman with weapons of mass
destruction, and therefore we need to get rid of him.” We
have heard words to this effect from various advocates of
invading Iraq. But none of these advocates has ever laid
out convincingly why they think Hussein is a mad man. In
fact, I know of no evidence that he is insane. We do have a
fair amount of evidence that Saddam Hussein is a bad
man. I think he’s also a rational man, in the narrow sense
of that word. That is, he responds to incentives. And his
rational response to the dangerous incentives President
Bush has set up for Hussein should make us afraid.
Economists believe that you can understand a lot of human
behavior by first understanding the incentives those
humans face. Consider the incentive that Bush Sr. set for
Saddam Hussein. In 1991, just before the Gulf War, the
elder Bush’s secretary of state James Baker stated that if
Hussein used chemical weapons against the U.S.-led
international coalition, Bush would consider “the strongest
possible response.” Most people understood at the time
that this was the Bush administration’s euphemism for
nuclear weapons. Although Bush Sr. has said many times
since that he never seriously considered using nuclear
weapons, he didn’t have to. Hussein got the point.
Whatever the wisdom of Bush’s threat, Hussein responded
rationally: he refrained from using chemical weapons in
the Gulf War.
But now Bush Jr. says he wants to get rid of Saddam
Hussein. You could argue that this is posturing and that
Bush doesn’t really mean it. But who believes that?
Probably one of the most sincere beliefs George W. Bush
has is that Hussein should go.
And let’s be honest here. Bush doesn’t want him to go to
Switzerland. Everyone understands that President Bush
wants Saddam Hussein to die. Someone who understands
that particularly well is Saddam Hussein.
So now consider how Bush Jr.’s words and actions have
changed the incentives for Hussein. He has good reason to
believe that President Bush wants him dead. He therefore
also knows that Bush’s staff is probably preparing, if it has
not already prepared, plans to kill Hussein. What’s
Hussein’s best response? If he is as evil as George W. Bush
and I both think he is, then he is indifferent between dying
alone and taking 1,000,000 innocent Iraqis with him. In
fact, he might actually prefer to die with a splash. So a
whole lot of innocent Iraqis might well die because
Hussein hides out among them or fights back. Moreover, if
Hussein is as evil as George Bush and I think he is, then he
would prefer to take a few hundred thousand other
innocent people—maybe Israelis or maybe even Americans
—with him.
Therefore, if we want to avoid the deaths of many innocent
Iraqis, and possibly of innocent Americans and Israelis,
George Bush has two choices. The high-risk choice is to go
after Saddam Hussein as soon as possible with a surprise
attack. Notice that I said “go after Saddam Hussein,” not
“go after Iraq.” In a choice between being the only target
and being one of a million Iraqi targets, Hussein would
much prefer the latter. For one thing, it would help him die
with a big splash; for another, the U.S. killing of many
innocent Iraqis would help with him achieve a legacy—the
unification of the Arab and Muslim worlds against the
United States. Presumably the way to go after Hussein
individually would be with an assassination squad.
There’s a second choice. That would be for Bush to
communicate, in a credible way, that he no longer wishes
to replace Saddam Hussein. In short, Bush could back off.
Both options are difficult. The first is hard because Hussein
is well protected. An even more serious problem with the
first option is that if Hussein were killed, he might still
have time to unleash his terror. The second option is
difficult because everyone knows Bush’s true wishes for
Hussein’s future.
To pursue the second option, therefore, President Bush
would have to communicate credibly that his wishes have
changed. One way to do the second is for Bush to take
seriously Saddam Hussein’s latest offer to let in weapons
inspectors. Bush and his people claim that Hussein is just
trying to buy time, and they might well be right. They
might also be wrong. On August 3, Bush’s spokesman,
State Department undersecretary for arms control John
Bolton, told the BBC, “our policy . . . insists on regime
change in Baghdad” and that “That policy will not be
altered whether inspectors go in or not.” Which is why a
good-faith move by Bush to talk to Hussein would be a
credible communication that Bush’s wishes have changed.
If, as Bolton said, no conceivable weapons-inspection
program would satisfy Bush, then we’re back to my point
about incentives. The incentive for Hussein, if he knows he
will be dead anyway, is to hurt many innocent people.
Last June, at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, I
presented the above thoughts at a lecture I gave to about
fifteen Admirals and other general officers in the U.S.
military. The resulting discussion was, as you might expect,
quite animated. Interestingly, though, even those who
most vociferously objected to my conclusion did not
challenge my reasoning about incentives. The only person
in the room who claimed to find a flaw stated that it was
unlikely that things would proceed as far as I thought. He
agreed with me that Saddam Hussein is rational. That, he
said, was precisely why my pessimistic outcome would not
occur. This Admiral’s point was that if Saddam Hussein
really did become convinced that he would be assassinated
or that his country would be attacked, he would agree to let
U.N. weapons inspectors into Iraq. I agreed with the
Admiral that this was a likely outcome if Saddam Hussein
believed that that would divert George Bush from his
avowed goal of overthrowing Hussein’s regime. I replied
that I was not convinced that would mollify George Bush
and, more important, I didn’t think Hussein would be
convinced either.
This Admiral’s reaction was interesting. “If Saddam
Hussein agreed to let weapons inspectors into Iraq,” he
objected, “what grounds would we have for attacking Iraq?
The United States doesn’t go around making war on
countries just because we don’t like their rulers. We obey
international law.”
I looked around the room and saw other Admirals nodding
their heads in agreement with their colleague. “Correct me
if I’m wrong,” I said, “but I believe that the U.S. invasion of
Panama clearly violated international law. Am I wrong
about that?” There followed a long silence.
Of course it is possible that weapons inspections could
proceed but that the inspectors would do a bad job. In that
case, Saddam Hussein could continue developing and
building weapons of mass destruction. But put this in
perspective. Many bloodthirsty evil governments develop
weapons of mass destruction. That fact alone doesn’t mean
that those governments would use those weapons on the
United States. And, as noted earlier, the Iraqi government
has never used weapons of mass destruction on the United
States and is not even threatening to do so now, except in
self-defense. There is something terribly wrong with a
government that makes war on people in another country
simply because that country’s government develops nasty
weapons. Certainly that’s what the above-mentioned
admirals thought.
Moreover, if the simple production of such weapons,
combined with control of those weapons by an evil
government, were enough justification for war, then the
United States government should attack North Korea, Iran,
China, and a handful of other countries.
The way to make it more likely that such weapons will be
used on the U.S. is to have our government continue
poking its military stick in hornets’ nests around the world.
That, surely, should have been one lesson from September
11. One of Osama bin Laden’s biggest gripes was that U.S.
troops were stationed on Saudi soil. Had it not been for the
Gulf War of 1991, we wouldn’t have had a toehold for our
troops in Saudi Arabia and, in all likelihood, those troops
would not have been there in 2001. In that case, we might
not be mourning 3,000 dead people this coming
September. Interestingly, it was this kind of meddling,
mainly by the Reagan administration, that encouraged
Saddam Hussein to turn his country into an offensive
military power. The simple fact is that when a government
intervenes in another government’s affairs, unintended
consequences, many of them bad, often result.
Of course, it’s possible that Saddam really doesn’t have
many weapons of mass destruction. But if that’s so, then
why this serious discussion of invading Iraq in the first
place? Either he has the weapons or he doesn’t. If he
doesn’t, let’s have our government stay out. If he does, then
lets have our government think carefully about the
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incentives Saddam Hussein faces so that many innocent
people, including some of us, don’t die.
